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Post-quantum: from maturity assessment to crypto-agility program

Editors' tools, a supervisor's clue: post-quantum maturity assessments are multiplying. Six questions to read, and what a crypto-agility program should add.

JdN
Journal du Net
Newswire · 5 h ago
◌ Single source2 min read
✦ Explain it to me
Post-quantum: from maturity assessment to crypto-agility program

Column by Amin Hasbini Hasbini Conseil November 20, 2026 5:14 p.m. Editor tools, hint from a supervisor: post-quantum maturity assessments are increasing. Six questions to read, and what a crypto-agility program should add.

At the end of September, a publisher specializing in quantum security presented a “readiness assessment” based on its cryptographic discovery platform. According to its product page, it delivers an inventory, a risk analysis, a migration roadmap and a crypto-agility strategy. On October 20, a large database publisher added to its security service an assessment of the cryptographic posture of registered databases, including quantum preparation. On November 2, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority with a university published a toolkit for its banks. Its quantum readiness index, launched in July, placed the sector at 2.3 out of 10, for a target of 10 in 2030. The post-quantum maturity assessment thus becomes a tool function, and in Hong Kong a supervision indicator.

Here I call maturity assessment a dated measurement of the cryptographic state of a perimeter, sometimes of its governance, by questionnaire or by automatic detection. Even accompanied by a roadmap, it remains a document. A crypto-agility program brings together named managers, dates, a budget and actually exercised algorithm changes, which allow cryptography to be modified when cryptanalysis requires it. The risk is that a note takes the place of a program. The Hong Kong regulator itself presented its index as a first snapshot.

On October 6, the GAO, the auditing body of the US Congress, published an audit of the 24 major federal agencies, finalized in September 2025. None fully applied the three practices drawn from the federal instructions of November 2022: a prioritized inventory updated each year, an estimate of funding and testing in its own environment. Only one had a complete inventory of its priority systems. Of six agencies reviewed in detail, none were able to fully document the accuracy of the registered algorithms for the systems being verified. Twenty-three out of 24 agencies did not have a documented process for keeping the inventory up to date, and none had conducted these tests.

Sixteen agencies considered it too early to test, because their suppliers were just starting to integrate the new algorithms. The GAO responds that the 2022 instructions already encouraged these tests, and that free tools made it possible to begin. This observation concerns American administrations, and it would undoubtedly be imprudent to transpose it as is to businesses. However, it illustrates the gap between having an inventory and verifying it, keeping it up to date, and then drawing decisions from it.

An assessment is still a good starting point, and I suggest six questions for reading it, whether it comes from a tool, a questionnaire or an auditor. On what scope has cryptography been inventoried, by detection or by declaration, and what remains unknown? Is it behind an interface, or hard-coded into applications? Can we replace it by simple configuration, without redoing the architecture? Is a named person responsible for this cryptography and its evolution? Is each system classified according to the length of time its data must remain secret or its evidentiary records? Finally, has an algorithm change already been made and measured, at least on a copy of the environment?

An overall score can hide a vulnerable dependency on a critical system, one that an attacker will be looking for. AI agents add a case to monitor, since the signature that an agent places on the trace of its actions, for the audit, should also appear in the inventory. In the implementations that I have examined, a still preliminary observation, it is often based on a classic algorithm fixed by the agent framework or its library, absent from the cryptographic inventory. If a quantum computer one day breaks this algorithm, these traces could be forged, and an audit trail kept for years without a timestamp or new signature will lose part of its evidentiary value.

At the Cybersecurity Conference in October, the cybersecurity director of a large French group described the transition from evaluation to program. His group began at the end of 2025 with a questionnaire on exposure to the quantum threat. The score was low, which he considered normal, because the exercise mainly served to establish the starting point. The group has established governance and appointed a program manager. It includes the first migrations in the 2027 roadmap of the IT department, intends to finance them from the part of the IT budget reserved for non-functional requirements, such as the prevention of obsolescence, and has entrusted crypto-agility to enterprise architects.

This work does not stop at a migration, because cryptanalysis is also progressing for reasons other than quantum. On November 6, an AI lab official announced, along with two working papers not yet peer-reviewed, that agents supervised by researchers had found two weaknesses, partly theoretical, in 1,024-bit key RSA. This old size can still be used in legacy systems, and according to the announcement, keys of 2048 bits and above are not affected. An evaluation completed in September was able to identify these keys without deeming them a priority, whereas a program in place can review this priority and designate who removes them.

The European roadmap of June 2025 recommends that member states support, by the end of 2026, cryptographic inventories created and then kept up to date. For financial entities outside the simplified regime, the DORA regulatory technical standards (Delegated Regulation 2024/1774, Article 6, paragraph 4) require that the encryption policy provides for the updating or modification, if necessary, of the cryptographic technology based on developments in cryptanalysis. in my opinion, a change in algorithm already carried out shows better than a note of maturity that these provisions work.

Before launching or ordering an assessment, three questions asked to the next risk committee help to frame its use. What decision will we make with its result, who will be responsible for it, and on what date will we change a first algorithm?

Source · Journal du Net ↗

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The reports
  1. Journal du Net
    20 Nov, 17:14
Trust score: 74/100
Publisher Journal du Net (general tier)+72
Detailed summary+2
Total74

Method: reports are grouped by the words of their headline and summary; each newsroom counts once; figures are read from the reports as published. Nothing here is written by an AI.